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Abstract. We study a spatial Prisoner’s dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on
a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner’s Dilemma games
with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor’s strategy with
a probability dependent on the payoﬀ diﬀerence and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have
diﬀerent eﬃciency in the transfer of their own strategies; therefore the strategy adoption probability is
reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of
the inﬂuential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low
densities.
PACS. 89.65.-s Social and economic systems – 89.75.Fb Structures and organization in complex
systems – 87.23.Cc Population dynamics and ecological pattern formation – 05.50.+q Lattice theory
and statistics
1 Introduction
For the consideration of cooperation among selﬁsh individ-
uals the application of evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) games proved to be a fruitful mathematical back-
ground [1]. In the original two-person one-shot game the
equivalent players have two options (to cooperate (C) or
to defect (D)) to choose and their payoﬀs depend on their
choices. The highest total payoﬀ is achieved and shared
equally if both players choose C. On the contrary, the
players share equally the lowest total income when both
choose defection. The highest individual payoﬀ is received
by the defector against the cooperator co-player who ob-
tains the lowest individual payoﬀ. The selﬁsh players are
enforced to choose defection that yields better score for
any choice of the co-player. In the traditional game the-
ory the players are intelligent, thus both selﬁsh individual
choose defection providing the second lowest income for
the players.
During the last decades the original concepts of game
theory [2] were extended for diﬀerent directions that
include the introduction of uncertainties, multi-agent
repeated games, evolutionary rules, etc. Due to the pro-
gressive research many ways were discovered how the co-
operation can be maintained in a society of selﬁsh indi-
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viduals as it is observed in real biological [3,4] and human
systems [5]. The most relevant mechanisms supporting co-
operation are the kin selection [6], direct reciprocity [5,7],
indirect reciprocity [8,9], group selection [10], and spatial
systems with short range interactions between the play-
ers [11] (for comparison and further references consult the
paper by Nowak [12]).
In the spatial evolutionary PD games the players’ pay-
oﬀ come from games with their neighbors and the players
can adopt a strategy from one of their neighbors with
a probability dependent on the payoﬀ diﬀerence. Most of
the early works were concentrated on the evaluation of the
average density of cooperators when varying the model pa-
rameters, like the set of strategies, the evolutionary rules
including noises, the payoﬀ values, and the structure of
connectivity (for a survey see [13,14]). It turned out that
cooperators cannot remain alive in the spatial evolution-
ary PD game if the temptation to choose defection (defec-
tor’s income against cooperator) exceeds a threshold value
dependent on the mentioned parameters. In contrary to
spatial evolutionary PD games, more than 80 percent of
payers choose cooperation within the whole range of payoﬀ
parameters in the models suggested by Santos et al. [15,16]
where the players were located on the sites of a scale-free
network.
For the investigation of human societies the so-called
social networks provide a more appropriate connectivity
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structure and diﬀerent versions of evolutionary PD games
were studied on small-world, scale-free, and other net-
works too [17–19]. An extremely large enhancement in the
portion of cooperators is occurring when the evolution-
ary rule is controlled by the diﬀerence of total incomes
that favors the strategy adoption from those players who
have a large number of neighbors [15,16]. In these mod-
els the players with many neighbors play a crucial role
in the maintenance of cooperation because their strat-
egy is adopted by their neighborhood and this process
is beneﬁcial for cooperators while it decreases the defec-
tor’s income. The same mechanism can occur and support
cooperation for those models where a portion of players
have enhanced activity in spreading their own strategy
over their neighborhood [20]. In real human societies these
latter players can represent inﬂuential players and masters
as well as prophets or agitators.
Some enhancement in the density of cooperators
was already reported by several authors who considered
the eﬀect of inhomogeneous strategy adoption probabili-
ties [21–23]. The most signiﬁcant increase of the coopera-
tive behavior is found for those types of inhomogeneities
where each player is characterized by a strategy transfer
capability quantifying the probability of strategy adoption
from the given player to her neighbors [20,24]. Subsequent
investigations have clariﬁed that the eﬃciency of this
mechanism can be improved if the number of neighbors
is increased even for regular connectivity structures [25].
Furthermore, it turned out that the co-evolution of strat-
egy distribution and strategy transfer capability yields an
inhomogeneity in the strategy transfer activity supporting
the cooperative behavior [26].
In the present paper the above investigations are ex-
tended to study what happens in a spatial evolutionary
PD games if the number of neighbors is large (24) while
the density of inﬂuential players is low. Such a large neigh-
borhood is natural in social systems. Besides it, the large
number of neighbors enhances the phenomenon and al-
low us to visualize its main features. For low densities of
inﬂuential players the direct links between these players
are rare. Consequently, the cooperative behavior cannot
spread away through these direct connections. Now we
show that this diﬃculty can be overcome if the inﬂuential
players are allowed to migrate. In this case the temporary
connections between the latter players can provide suit-
able conditions for the cooperators to rule over the whole
system.
2 The model
We consider an evolutionary two-strategy Prisoner’s
Dilemma game with players located on the sites (x) of
a square lattice. Two types of players are distinguished
and their spatial distribution is described by an Ising for-
malism (nx = A or B). The portion of players A and B
are ﬁxed [ν and (1 − ν)]. The player at site x can follow
either an unconditional cooperator (sx = C) or defector
(sx = D) strategy, denoted by unit vectors as
sx = C =
(
1
0
)
or D =
(
0
1
)
. (1)
This notation allows us to use a simple matrix algebra for
the deﬁnition of the total income Ux of player x coming
from PD games played with all her neighbors y ∈ Ωx,
that is,
Ux =
∑
y∈Ωx
s+x A · sy , (2)
where s+x is the transpose of the state vector sx, and the
summation runs over all the neighbors of player x. In the
present case each player has 24 neighbors (|Ωx| = 24) lo-
cated inside a block of 5×5 sites around the central player
x. Following the notation suggested by Nowak et al. [11]
we use the rescaled payoﬀ matrix:
A =
(
1 0
b 0
)
, 1 < b < 2 , (3)
where we have only one parameter b characterizing the
temptation to choose defection. In the present evolution-
ary PD game a randomly chosen player x could adopt the
strategy from one of its randomly chosen neighbors y ∈ Ωx
with a probability W (sx → sy) depending on the payoﬀ
diﬀerence and the type of player y [20]. Namely,
W (sx → sy) = wy 11 + exp [(Ux − Uy)/K] , (4)
where K characterizes the uncertainties (stochastic noises)
in the value of total payoﬀ [27–29] and/or a freedom for
the players to make irrational decisions when adopting a
strategy [30,31]. The multiplicative factor wy deﬁnes the
strategy transfer capability of the player y in the following
way
wy =
{
1, if ny = A
w, if ny = B
. (5)
Players of type A are considered as inﬂuential players who
are capable to convince their neighbors (with a high eﬃ-
ciency on comparison to players of type B) to follow them
in the choice of strategy.
The system started from a state where a fraction ν of
players (distributed randomly) belong to the type A and
the rest of players are B. In the random initial state the
players follow C or D strategies with equal probability in-
dependently of their types. During one Monte Carlo step
(MCS) each player has a chance once on average to adopt
a strategy from one of their neighbors (chosen at random)
as described above. Besides it, the inﬂuential players are
allowed to move. More precisely, after each MCS a frac-
tion f of A players (chosen at random) can exchange their
site with one of the randomly selected nearest neighbors
y if ny = B, that is, (sx, sy) → (sy, sx), nx = A → B,
and ny = B → A. The magnitude of f characterizes the
migration (diﬀusivity) of inﬂuential players. The simula-
tions were performed on a square lattice with a size L×L
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under periodic boundary conditions. After a suitable ther-
malization time tt we have evaluated the concentration ρ
of cooperators in the stationary states by averaging over
a sampling time ts. Most of the MC simulations were per-
formed for L = 400, K = 2.4, and ν = 0.02 for diﬀerent
values of w, b, and f . As the relaxation (thermalization)
time depends on w therefore tt = ts is varied from 104
to 106 MCS. The longer run time is used for small values
of w when most of the players (of type B) modify their
strategy with a low frequency proportional to w.
3 Monte Carlo results for quenched
distribution of types
First we investigate the system when the motion of play-
ers A is forbidden (f = 0) for a small density (ν = 0.02)
which is signiﬁcantly lower than the optimum (νopt  0.2)
discussed in a previous paper [25]. Figure 1 illustrates the
main features of the spatial distribution of strategies and
types (sx and nx) for a low value of w. The snapshot shows
clearly that players of type A are surrounded by players
following the same strategy. That is cooperative A players
have cooperative neighbors and defective A players have
defective ones. This means that the income of cooperating
As (in short, AC players) is enhanced by their neighbor-
hood (BC players) while the defecting As receive a very
low payoﬀ. In fact, this short range correlation (in the
strategy distribution) is the reason why cooperators can
survive for the given parameters (b and K) ensuring sur-
vival only for defectors in the homogeneous system (i.e.
for ν = 0 or 1, or for w = 1 at arbitrary ν).
For such a large neighborhood and a large value of
1/w one can think that the short-time dynamics (strat-
egy adoption) between two neighboring A players can be
approximated by introducing an eﬀective payoﬀ matrix
as it was described by Pacheco et al. [32] when studying
the co-evolution of strategy distribution and connectiv-
ity structure. One can observe in Figure 1 that both the
AC and AD players form small colonies. We have to em-
phasize that the strategy distribution varies continuously
and due to the stochastic noise even an AD player can be
transformed into AC and vice versa. For the present low
value of ν the overlapping neighborhood of the A players
do not span the whole system. Consequently, the strategy
ﬂuctuations in the intermediate regions play a crucial role
in the coexistence of D and C strategies.
For the quantitative analysis MC simulations were per-
formed to determine the average density (ρ) of coopera-
tors when varying the payoﬀ parameter (temptation b)
for several values of w while other parameters are ﬁxed.
Figure 2 compares six curves describing a monotonous de-
crease of ρ from 1 to 0 within a coexistence region where
0 < ρ < 1. This means that only defectors remain alive
if b > bc2(K,w, ν) and cooperators prevail the whole sys-
tems if b < bc1(K,w, ν) (both threshold values depend
on the model parameters). The eﬀect of inhomogeneous
teaching activity is practically negligible if the ratio 1/w
is not large enough. Notice that two curves (obtained for
AD: AC: BD: BC:
Fig. 1. (Color online) A typical distribution of the strategies
(D or C) and types (A or B) of players on a square lattice (with
a block size of 100 × 100) for a quenched random distribution
of players A if ν = 0.02, b = 1.25, K = 2.4, and w = 0.001.
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Fig. 2. Average density of cooperators in the stationary state
(within the coexistence region) as a function of b for six diﬀer-
ent values of w (from left to right w = 1, 0.2, 0.05, 0.02, 0.005,
and 0.002) if K = 2.4 and ν = 0.02.
w = 1 and 0.2) practically coincide in Figure 2. On the
contrary, the density of cooperators as well as the second
threshold value of temptation (bc2(K,w, ν)) is increased
signiﬁcantly if w becomes very small. At the same time,
the MC results indicate only a small increase in the ﬁrst
threshold value of temptation [bc1(K,w, ν)].
If parameters are tuned in the homogeneous (w = 1)
spatial system, then the extinction of cooperators (or
even defectors) exhibits a critical phase transition belong-
ing to the directed percolation universality class [33–35].
This means that the decrease of density follows a power
law behavior when approaching the critical point, that
is ρ ∼ |b− bc|β if b → bc, where the value of exponent
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Fig. 3. Log-log plot of the time-dependence of the density
of cooperators for diﬀerent values of b (from top to bottom
b = 1.4, 1.45, 1.47, 1.48, 1.49, and 1.51) if w = 0.002, K = 2.4,
ν = 0.02, and L = 1800.
β is determined by the spatial dimension. The algebraic
decrease of ρ is accompanied by a divergency in ﬂuctua-
tions, correlation length, and relaxation time (for details
see [36,37]). These features cause technical diﬃculties in
the accurate determination of ρ because long run time
and large system size are required in the close vicinity of
the critical point. The technical diﬃculties become more
pronounced if a Griﬃths-like phase occur in the inhomo-
geneous spatial system [38]. This is the reason why data
with a small value of ρ are missing in Figure 2 for low
values of w.
Figure 3 shows several examples about how the den-
sity ρ(t) of cooperators evolves towards the ﬁnal stationary
state in the vicinity of the second transition point. Despite
of the large system size (L = 1800) the vanishing density
of cooperators exhibits some relevant ﬂuctuation prevent-
ing the clear visualization of the average behavior in the
log-log plot for suﬃciently long times. In order to suppress
the undesired disturbance of ﬂuctuation the data in Fig-
ure 3 are averaged over a time window (0.8tn < t < 1.2tn
where tn  2n/2) with an interval increasing linearly with
t. The smoothed data suggest that the density of coopera-
tors decrease algebraically (ρ(t) ∼ t−δ) with an exponent
δ > 0 dependent on b. The upper curve of this plot illus-
trates an example where ρ(t) tends to a ﬁnite limit value.
Similar behavior was reported for other simpler mod-
els (e.g., contact process) when considering the extinction
of a species (or any other objects or states) on a quenched
inhomogeneous spatial background [39–43]. On the inho-
mogeneous backgrounds we can distinguish patches pro-
viding better conditions for the species (henceforth strate-
gies) to survive. For low densities (ρ) of the disappearing
strategies the active territories are separated from each
other and the whole process can be well approximated by
the statistical description of independent extinctions on
patches of diﬀerent sizes. The average life-time increases
with the size s of the mentioned patches while the proba-
bility of their appearance decreases exponentially with s.
Noest [39,40] has shown that the resulting process yields
an algebraic decay. Recent theoretical investigations of
the random contact process [44–47] are focused on clar-
iﬁcation of what happens when varying the strength of
inhomogeneity (for a survey see [48]). Similar behavior
is expected in the present model. Unfortunately the nu-
merical conﬁrmation of the mentioned feature exceeds our
computational capabilities. We have to emphasize, how-
ever, that technical diﬃculties are reduced if the inhomo-
geneous background changes continuously. In the latter
case the system becomes equivalent to the homogeneous
cases for suﬃciently large time- and length-scales [37,43]
and this feature simpliﬁes the numerical analysis as dis-
cussed below.
4 Monte Carlo results for moving inﬂuential
players
In this section we study the system when a slow motion
of A players is introduced. Most of the subsequent MC
data are obtained for ν = 0.02 when 10% of players A
(f = 0.1) are allowed to exchange their position with one
of the neighbors as described above. In agreement with the
expectations, for such a slow migration the AC (AD) play-
ers are surrounded by cooperating BCs (defecting BDs).
As a result, at the beginning of the evolutionary process
one can observe a spatial distribution similar to the one
plotted in Figure 1. For slow motion the given neighbor-
hoods accompany the (central) inﬂuential players. Due to
their motion the rare A players can approach each other
and when two of them interact then AC convinces AD to
cooperate with a high probability and within a short time
this new strategy will be adopted by the neighbors, too.
Consequently, the number of AD players decreases grad-
ually as demonstrated in the upper snapshot of Figure 4.
In the present model the highest individual income is
received by a solitary defector because she exploits all her
cooperating neighbors. So the strategy of the solitary de-
fector of type B can be transferred to her neighborhood
unless this player adopt cooperation from a neighboring
AC player. The lower snapshot in Figure 4 shows a situ-
ation when the moving AC players eliminate the (small)
groups of AD players. Sometimes, however, the strategy
of the solitary defector can be adopted even by a neigh-
boring AC player who will enforce her neighbors to form
a gang of defectors as illustrated in the lower snapshot of
Figure 4. The formation of the defector gang reduces the
income of the focal AD player who will be conquered by
an AC player opposing her sooner or later and ﬁnally the
defection becomes extinct in the whole system.
In order to quantify the eﬃciency of the mechanism
described above we have determined the functions ρ(b) at
f = 0.1. For the sake of comparison the rest of parame-
ters are equivalent to those used in the previous section.
The results plotted in Figure 5 are similar to those ob-
tained for quenched distributions of A players at their
higher densities (e.g., ν = 0.2 [25]). The most striking
diﬀerence between the results of Figures 2 and 5 is that
here the ﬁrst transition occurs at higher values of b. In
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Fig. 4. (Color online) Two snapshots on the distribution of the
strategies and types of players at times t = 1000 MCS (upper
plot) and t = 10 000 MCS (lower) for ν = 0.02, b = 1.25,
K = 2.4, f = 0.1, and w = 0.001. In the ﬁnal stationary state
all the players cooperate. Code of colors as in Figure 1.
other words, the moving AC players are capable to defeat
those (rare) gangs of defectors which are stabilized for
some quenched constellations. As well as for higher densi-
ties of A players the coexistence region shifts towards the
larger values of b when the strategy transfer capability (w)
of B players is decreased. The results in Figure 5 indicate
a logarithmic increase in the critical values of temptation,
i.e., δbc ∼ ln 1/w. The systematic analysis of this eﬀect
(for lower values of w) is prevented by the long relaxation
time increasing with 1/w.
The visualization of the evolution of strategy distri-
bution (for typical snapshots see Figs. 1 and 4) indicates
clearly that the evolutionary process is mainly controlled
by the competition between the moving AC and AD play-
ers surrounded by their own followers. In some sense the
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Fig. 5. Average density of cooperators versus b if the motion
of players A is allowed. Parameters are the same as in Figure 2
excepting that here f = 0.1.
situation is analogous to the case of group (and/or kin)
selection [10,49–51]. The ﬂuctuating neighborhood of the
moving AC and AD players induces uncertainties in the
ﬁnal results when they compete with each other. Besides
it, the strategy distribution in the ‘no man’s land’ (con-
sisting of sites not inﬂuenced by players A) can also aﬀect
the variation of strategy for players of type A. All these
processes together yield a complex behavior dependent on
the model parameters. In the next section the eﬀect of
mobility (f) is investigated quantitatively.
5 Eﬀect of mobility
In the limit of large mobility the advantage of the AC play-
ers vanishes because they cannot beneﬁt from their follow-
ers left behind during their motion. Furthermore, their fast
motion can be interpreted as a mixing favoring defection
(see the results of mean-ﬁeld approximation [14]). In the
opposite limit (f → 0) the system is expected to repro-
duce a behavior discussed for the quenched distribution of
A players. Now we study what happens when varying the
mobility of A players.
For low values of 1/w the small enhancement of coop-
eration is reduced gradually when f is increased (see the
lowest data obtained for w = 0.02 in Fig. 6). On the con-
trary, one can observe a local maximum in the density of
cooperators at an optimum value of f if w = 0.005. The
density of cooperators reaches its saturation value (ρ = 1)
within a suitable range of f if 1/w exceeds a threshold
value. For all the three plotted curves the density of coop-
erators vanishes if f exceeds a threshold value dependent
on the parameters.
6 Eﬀect of density of inﬂuential players
Previous investigations [15,16,52] have indicated clearly
that on the scale-free graphs the introduction of addi-
tional links between the inﬂuential players can suppress
the mechanism supporting the emergence of cooperative
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Fig. 6. Average density of cooperators as a function of mobility
f for b = 1.15, K = 2.4, ν = 0.02, and w = 0.002, 0.005, and
0.02 (from top to bottom).
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Fig. 7. Average density of cooperators vs. density ν of inﬂuen-
tial players for diﬀerent values of temptation (b = 1.2, 1.3, and
1.35 from top to bottom) at f = 0.1, K = 2.4, and w = 0.002.
behavior. Similarly, an optimal density ν of A players was
found on the two-dimensional lattices for quenched distri-
bution of players A and B. It turned out that the optimal
value of ν depends mainly on the number of neighbors but
it is also aﬀected by other parameters (e.g., b and K).
Figure 7 summarizes the results of MC simulations ob-
tained for three diﬀerent values of b while other param-
eters are ﬁxed. The results indicate clearly that optimal
density of inﬂuential players is reduced particularly for
such values of b and K where the cooperation can be main-
tained at a low level. The lowest curve in Figure 7 shows
clearly the appearance of a maximum at ν = νopt  0.03
when varying ν if K = 2.4, b = 1.35, f = 0.1, and
w = 0.002 while for these ﬁxed parameters the cooper-
ators remain alive only within a range of ν. Similar be-
havior can be observed when the survival of C strategy is
supported by decreasing the temptation b. More precisely,
the proﬁle of the curve ρ(ν) becomes wider and higher
until reaching the saturation value. Notice that the coop-
erators die out for all the three cases plotted in Figure 7
if the density of inﬂuential players exceeds a value (0.21)
close to the optimum for quenched disorder.
7 Summary
Within the framework of evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma
games we have studied the improvement of cooperative be-
havior with two types of players (both are following either
cooperation or defection unconditionally) if the inﬂuential
players (type A) are allowed to walk randomly through the
whole square lattice. Our analysis is concentrated to sys-
tems with a small portion of inﬂuential players where the
players have large neighborhood (n = 24). In these cases
the inﬂuential players and their followers form an apparent
group if there is a relevant diﬀerence between the strat-
egy transfer capability between the A and B players. As
a result, the evolution of strategy distribution is governed
basically by the competition between the cooperative and
defective inﬂuential players in such a way that the direct
PD interaction (payoﬀ) can be replaced by an eﬀective
interaction related to games with re-scaled payoﬀs. Sim-
ilar phenomenon was described by Pacheco et al. [32,53]
who studied the co-evolution of strategy distribution and
connectivity structure. Besides it, the processes in the
present model are resembling the kin and/or group selec-
tions [6,10,49] supporting cooperation, too. In comparison
with the mentioned models, here the randomly moving
groups (inﬂuential players) interact temporarily (if they
are suﬃciently close to each other). In the present case
the strategy adoptions between the inﬂuential players are
aﬀected by the time-dependent structure of groups and
also by the strategy ﬂuctuations in the territories not af-
fected directly by the inﬂuential players.
Our numerical investigations have clearly shown that
the temporary links between the moving inﬂuential players
promote the spreading (and maintenance) of cooperative
behavior. In comparison with the case of quenched dis-
tribution of A players, the quantitative analysis has con-
ﬁrmed that higher level of cooperation can be achieved if
the system has less number of inﬂuential players who can
move randomly with an optimal rate.
This work was supported by the Hungarian National Re-
search Fund (Grant No. 73449) and by the COST P10 project
“Physics of Risk”.
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